On Sikh ethics; includes brief biographies of Sikh religious leaders.

The words 'true value' assume an existential relationship with the thing being measured. There is assumed to exist some aspect of the thing being measured that is independent of its relationship to the person who is interested in the result of the measurement. Yet measurement is a response to the need of an observer to know something about the real world. There is therefore an epistemological aspect to measurement. Some aspect of measurement has to do with the observer as a (...) knower of the result of the measurement. The paper considers electrical measurement. It proposes that these relationships correspond to two distinct kinds of measurement: one has the characteristic that there does exist such a thing as a true value, though it cannot be known: in the other kind, no such thing as true value even exists. The notion of true value is very useful, and for the kind of measurement where such a thing does not exist, the paper defines an alternative that has the advantage that it can actually be known under some circumstances in calibration. (shrink)

Translation and interpretation of selected Hadith on Islamic ethics and coduct.

This book offers a Wittgensteinian study of concept possession and of the nature of conceptual investigation in philosophy. It is both an ideal advanced introduction to Wittgenstein's philosophy and an original treatment of some of its most crucial yet least developed regions. The book is written as a Socratic dialogue, which frames the discussion within a backward glance to Plato's Theory of Forms. In so doing it makes a bold claim as to Wittgenstein's place in Western philosophy.

Probably to most students of Moral Philosophy there comes a time when they feel a vague sense of dissatisfaction with the whole subject. And the sense of dissatisfaction tends to grow rather than to diminish. It is not so much that the positions, and still more the arguments, of particular thinkers seem unconvincing, though this is true. It is rather that the aim of the subject becomes increasingly obscure. "What," it is asked, "are we really going to learn by Moral (...) Philosophy?" "What are books on Moral Philosophy really trying to show, and when their aim is clear, why are they so unconvincing and artificial?" And again: "Why is it so difficult to substitute anything better?" Personally, I have been led by growing dissatisfaction of this kind to wonder whether the reason may not be that the subject, at any rate as usually understood, consists in the attempt to answer an improper question. And in this article, I shall venture to contend that the existence of the whole subject, as usually understood, rests on a mistake, and on a mistake parallel to that on which rests, as I think, the subject usually called the Theory of Knowledge. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In elementary derivations of the quantization of azimuthal angular momentum the eigenfunction is determined to be exp(im φ), which is “oversensitive” to the rotation φ → φ+2π, unlessm is an integer. In a recent paper Kerner examined the classical system of charge and magnetic pole, and expressed Π, a vector constant of motion for the system, in terms of a physical angle ψ, to deduce a remarkable paradox. Kerner pointed out that Π(ψ) is “oversensitive” to ψ → ψ+2π unless a (...) certain charge quantization condition is met. Our explicandum of this paradox highlights the distinction between coordinates in classical and quantum physics. It is shown why the single-valuedness requirement on Π(ψ) is devoid of physical significance. We are finally led to examine the classical analog of the quantum mechanical argument that demonstrates the quantization of magnetic charge, to show that there is “no hope” of a classical quantization condition. (shrink)

Concerning the nature of desires that pertain to actions, considers the view that we cannot desire something unless we know or think, first, that it does not exist, and second, that it does not exist now. Finds a core of truth in this, but modifies the formula to claim that ‘we can only desire the existence of that of the existence of which in the past, present, or future, as the case may be, we are uncertain.’ Put more simply, a (...) desire is not a desire for the existence of something, but rather a desire for something to be. It follows from this view that we cannot desire something to be the case when we think that, without a doubt, it will be the case. (shrink)

The author re-Examines the evidence (including the manuscript evidence) relevant to an understanding of the historico-Philosophical relationship of john locke to rene descartes and, Consequently, Of the relationship of "the empirical school" to "rationalism." arguing against a standardly accepted view (that of, Among others, Richard aaron), He suggests that, Both early and late, In the drafts of 1671 and in the "mature" "essay", Locke rejected descartes' science and philosophy of science precisely because he rejected his epistemology; furthermore, He rejected descartes' (...) epistemology precisely because he rejected his method and logic. (shrink)

To the question ‘What does it mean to act or to do something?’, replies that it is not easy to identify a common character in actions. Begins by examining the position of Cook Wilson, who maintains that ‘to do something’ means to originate, cause, or bring into existence, either directly or indirectly, some not yet existing state either in oneself or some other body. Although Prichard agrees that usually action involves causing something, he observes that causing a change is not (...) itself an activity. In moving one's hand, one performs that indefinable mental activity of willing some change. The movement of the hand is the effect of the action, not the action itself, a fact overlooked by thinkers like Locke. Turning to the nature of the desire behind one's willing, Prichard rejects the view that this desire is actually a desire for the change willed. Despite forceful objections, Prichard maintains that this desire is the desire for the willing of that change. (shrink)